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Standard econometric approaches have been many years a well-established workhorse 
in economic research. However, widespread application of macroeconomic models with 
explicit micro-foundations since rational expectations revolution in 1970 gave birth to 
experimental macroeconomics recently, where controlled environment might be used to get 
insights regarding the effects of alternative institutions and policies with direct implications at 
the aggregate level. This article aims to enrich present discussion about appropriateness of this 
method, since a very few studies deal with this new phenomenon among others Ricciuti 
(2008), Duffy (1998). We claim that experimental macroeconomics shouldn´t be omitted as 
one of the possible methods in economics, since individual and aggregate outcomes might be 
assessed. As a result, it should represent complement to standard econometric techniques. 
Furthermore, illustrative case study is used to demonstrate that macroeconomic experiments 
are not a distinct ones from microeconomic ones and represent powerful instrument for 
evaluation of micro-founded macroeconomic models. 
 




Standard econometric approaches have been many years a well-established workhorse 
in economic research. Recently, experimental economics has gained considerable standing as 
an alternative method. However, a very special subfield called experimental macroeconomics 
is still very unheard of, despite being utilized by many well-known economists as mentioned 
in studies of Ochs (1995), Duffy (1998) and Ricciuti (2008). 
Experimental macroeconomics as a relatively new discipline aims to address aggregate 
economic phenomena with help of controlled laboratory methods in which specific 
assumptions and predictions of macroeconomic models are tested. Without rational 
expectation revolution (Lucas 1972), development of experimental macroeconomics would 
have been impossible. Since then, macroeconomic propositions started to be based on 
individual maximizing behavior, given the constraint. These micro-foundations of 
macroeconomic models opened the space for experimental macroeconomics, which observes 
interaction of individuals in artificial environment followed by individual and aggregate 
outcomes. Based on that, powerfulness of micro-foundations of macroeconomic models might 
be assessed.  
Although there are many possible insights to be gained, still experimental results are 
met with skepticism with regards to macroeconomic implications from rather insufficient 
experimental samples. As argued by Sims (1996, p. 107) “Economists can do very little 
experimentation to produce crucial data. This is particularly true of macroeconomics.”  
This article aims to contribute to relatively new research, outline relatively new 
subfield of experimental macroeconomics and disprove common misleads about experimental 
macroeconomics. After delineation of position of experimental macroeconomics within the 
laboratory economics, identification of the main burning downsides of macroeconomic 




experiments mentioned by critiques is the case. Based on that, arguments in favor of this new 
method are discussed in order to alleviate frequently mentioned deficiencies of experimental 
design. Furthermore, illustrative case study is used to demonstrate that macroeconomic 
experiments are not distinct from microeconomic ones and represent powerful instrument for 
evaluation of micro-founded macroeconomic models. 
 
The Nature of Experimental Macroeconomics 
In order to understand the true nature of experimental macroeconomics, its position 
within the laboratory economics has to be delineated. According to Ricciuti (2008) two 
classes of experiments are present in macroeconomics. The first approach considers an 
experiment which concentrates on single market. Not only it is easy to apply ceteris paribus 
condition in case of a single market, but this approach is more consistent with the current 
character of macroeconomic modeling, based on micro-foundations. As a result, most 
experiments fall rather within this category. The main purpose of these types of experiments is 
to test microeconomic predictions and assumptions of macroeconomic models with direct 
implications at the aggregate level. This type of experiment may be summarized in vein of 
Duffy (2011, p.6) who claims: “In practice, experimental macroeconomics is not distinct from 
microeconomic laboratory experiments, there is just a different focus or interpretation. A 
macroeconomic experiment is one that tests the predictions of macroeconomic model or its 
assumptions or is framed in the language of macroeconomics.“ Even Ricciuti (2008) 
emphasizes that it is almost impossible to find a substantial difference of macroeconomic 
experiment over microeconomic one, since these type of experiments are based on individual 
behavior of agents and the only macroeconomic feature is analysis of aggregates such as 
inflation, unemployment, etc. The second approach was firstly applied by Charles Plott in 
several of his experiments and is the one, which has a real macroeconomic content due to its 
focus on inter-relations between several markets and the spill-over between them. This 
Walrasian type of the laboratory experimentation is related to examination of the system 
effects, equilibration and spillowers between markets. To sum it up, although laboratory 
economy is not as complicated as the real economy, its simplified version may provide clue 
whether the model can or cannot be applied to more complex real world. If a simplified 
version of the economy in the laboratory does not reject the model of macroeconomic 
behavior, it means that the model may be actually plausible. 
Precise origins of macroeconomic experiments are rather not clear according to Duffy 
(2008). Explicit statement of the existence of macroeconomic experiment within economics 
are mostly dated to Robert Lucas´s (1986) invitation to macroeconomists to conduct 
controlled laboratory experiments to cope with coordination problems, which remained 
unsolved by macroeconomic theory. However, Vernon Smith´s (1962) double auction 
experiment is prevalently considered as the first macroeconomic experiment conducted ever. 
Sometimes it is pointed to Phillips´ (1950) experiment, which used a colored liquid-filled 
tubular flow model of the macroeconomy, which however did not involve human subjects. 
Additionally, John Carlson´s (1967) experiment, which aimed to examine price expectations 
in stable and unstable versions of the Cobweb model is also one of the first possible attempts.  
 
Possible Insights and Common Downsides of Macroeconomic Experiments  
The basic difference between experimental approach to testing theories and standard 
macroeconomic modelling might be illustrated with help of Figure 1 below. According to 
Noussair (2012) both methods have the same chain starting from the structure of the economy, 
followed by agents´ behavior with outcomes at the end. The difference lies in the way how to 
reach the final outcomes. Whereas theoretical models simply assume the structure of the 
economy, macroeconomic experiments set up the structure of the economy in the laboratory 
environment. Secondly, in case of theory the behavior of agents follows from assumption 




given by the structure of the economy. In case of macroeconomic experiment it ensues from 
the interaction of individuals and their decision-making in artificial environment.  
 Lastly, in case of theoretical models simulated outcomes and equilibria are outputs 
which might be compared with the data acquired on the basis of the laboratory experiment. 
Figure 1: Experimental Approach to Testing Macroeconomic Theories 









Source: Noussair, (2012). 
 
The basic advantage of experimental economics as opposed to real data is that it offers 
full control over parameters in the lab, since the experimenter is flexible in modelling and can 
set parameters in a desirable manner and direction. As a result, precise information about the 
factors, which changed during the experiment are available, (Ricciuti, 2008). This is also 
connected to micro-level causal relationships, since experimenter can directly isolate 
phenomenon which he aims to test via parameters setting. Moreover, unaccounted factors are 
highly eliminated. Causal relationship in terms of so called internal validity is secured by 
specification of experimental group, which is exposed to tested effect and control group, 
which is not exposed to this effect, but otherwise groups face the same conditions ceteris 
paribus. Critiques point out to Duhem-Quine problem related to under-determination (and 
impossibility to secure all ceteris paribus condition), due to which it is highly tough to secure 
internal validity and thereby examine given phenomenon. However, this is general problem in 
experimental economics, (See for instance Guala 2005). Furthermore, if we make comparison 
of experimental data with field data, they cannot be described by the same degree of internal 
validity in terms of causal relationship, (Duffy 2008). Additional argument, which goes in 
favor of laboratory experimentation is replication of the experiment (with adjustment) if 
doubts about internal validity emerge, (Smith, 1982). Concerns about internal validity are 
common for both microeconomic and macroeconomic experiments together. However, what 
are the most striking methodological concerns related directly to experimental 
macroeconomics?  
The most frequently mentioned issue, which is considered to be a delicate problem, is 
external validity. External validity refers to “inferring from the special circumstances created 
in the laboratory to the phenomena that takes places in the real world”, (Guala 2005, p.141). 
Firstly, external validity is also common for microeconomic experiments. As a result we 
should delineate external validity in case of macroeconomic experiments, which is rather 
related to the problem of sample size. Secondly, artificiality seems to play also some role, but 
that is also the case for microeconomic experiments. As opponents point out, substantial 
internal validity at the expense of external validity may lead to high artificiality of experiment, 
whose results is impossible to apply in the real world, (Starmer 1999), Cartwright 2007). For 
instance Lowenstein (1999) points out that economists “have not been able to avoid the 
problem of low external validity that is the Achilles heel of all laboratory experimentation,” 
(Lowenstein 1999, p.3). 
To clarify the former, macroeconomic experiments are described by rather small 
sample size. Involving small groups of experimental subjects interacting for a short period of 
time represents serious problem according to opponents, in order to utilize experimental 
outputs and derive implications for the real world. The analysis of aggregate economic 




















phenomena or even testing of predictions or assumptions of models is met with some 
skepticism due to non-representativeness of the laboratory experiment from macroeconomic 
point of view. However, with the current trend of macroeconomic models with 
microeconomic foundations, the issue of number of subjects may not represent a problem. 
Classes of macroeconomic experiments centered on single market are considered to be rather 
simplification of the real economy, which is aimed to test exactly microeconomic foundations 
of macroeconomic models. In other words, definition of macroeconomic experiment itself 
provides justification for acceptable external validity, consistent with the current trend of 
macroeconomic modeling. Moreover, their scientific strength is in building on economic 
theory, (Ricciuti, 2008, Duffy, 2008). Additionally, studies of Smith´s double auction (1962), 
Forsythe (1982), Plott and Sunder (1982), Sunder (1995) with partial equilibrium approaches 
and Lian and Plott (1998) with a general equilibrium approach, generally conclude that small 
population of 5-10 subjects with enough trading experience is sufficient in order to achieve 
efficiency consistent with competitive equilibrium in various market environments. Statement 
about not necessarily large sample size is documented by various experimental studies of 
macroeconomic nature like Fehr a Tyran (2008), with number of subjects n=76, Fehr, 
Kirchsteiger, Riedl (1998), n=52, Adam (2007) n=30, Duffy a Fisher (2005), n=10, Arifovic, 
Sargent, (2003), n=12, Van Huyck, et.al (1994), n=40 and others. Additionally, we should not 
rest on too restrictive definition of macroeconomic experiment, since there are many 
experiments like coordination issues, which have purely microeconomic content with 
macroeconomic flavor as noted by Duffy (2008).  
To clarify the latter, internal validity at the expense of external should not be 
considered as serious problem, since the degree of external validity is dependent on type of 
the experiment. Schramm (2005) emphasizes that highly theoretical experiment doesn´t 
necessarily require high degree of external validity, but rather of internal validity in order to 
secure strong causality. In this case, experiments are used to test performance of theories in 
light of working institutions or to test the initial assumptions of the theory. The other side is 
represented by experiments designed to test-bed policies. In these experiments external 
validity is of a major importance. This is usually common, when some new institutional 
design is tested and requires unique practical skills, which are out of student´s domain. 
 
Illustrative Macroeconomic Experiment  
Robert Lucas´s (1986) invitation to conduct macroeconomic experiments was 
followed up on by many influential economists, recently Lim, Prescott and Sunder (1994), 
Marimon and Sunder (1993), (1994), (1995), with a consequent expansion of macroeconomic 
theories tested in the laboratory, among others by Duffy and Fisher, (2005), Van Huyck et al. 
(1990), (1991), 1994), Arifovic, Sargent (2003), Bernasconi, Kirchkamp (2000), Deck (2004), 
Duffy, Ochs, (1999), (2012), Fehr and Tyran (2007), Fehr and Tyran (2008), Heinemann, 
Nagel, Ockenfels (2004), Hey (1994), Noussair, Plott, Riezmann (2007), Lei, Noussair, 
(2007) and others. There is infinite variety of macroeconomic experiments, ranging from 
Walrasian competitive equilibrium, asset price bubbles and crashes, bank runs, sunspots, 
Keynesian coordination failures to speculative currency attacks and contagions. 
This study will restrict attention to microeconomic experiment with macroeconomic 
flavor in vein of Fehr and Tyran (2001) in order to further support afore-mentioned 
methodological discussion and provide possible justification for conducting macroeconomic 
experiments. Experiment is based on n-player pricing game with unique equilibrium and 
strategic complementarity in vein of Haltiwanger and Waldmann (1989), where the best 
reaction of individual in order to maximize profits is to set price, which is positively related to 
the average price set by other n-1 players. The game has 40 rounds plus one trial period, with 
a group size of n=4.  Experiment is divided into a pre-shock and a post-shock phase, all of 
which has T=20 periods. Fully anticipated negative monetary shock is implemented during 




the game, which is common knowledge to participants, (reduction of money supply from 
M0=42 to M1=14). Treatment groups received payoff functions, which provide them with 
information about their pricing strategy. Pay-offs of participants are expressed either in 
nominal or real terms. In order for subject to decide correctly about the price of his product 
(price lies between 1 and 30) in the nominal environment, he needs to re-count nominal pay-
off into the real pay-off.  The nominal pay off is given by P-i. πi. In order to compute real 
payoff, subjects have to divide their nominal payoffs P-i. πi by P-i. 
 The real pay-off of subject i is given in Fehr, Tyran (2001) by: 
πi = πi (Pi, P-i, M)    i=1,.... n 
 where Pi stands for nominal price, P-i is the average price of the other n-1 group 
members, and M is nominal shock variable. Subjects are informed about payoffs of other 
subjects in the group, since x and y types players are present in nominal treatment. The need 
to recount nominal pay-off into real pay-off is a cognitively challenging task, which is the 
main barrier to optimal behaviour. This experiment aimed to test the ability of subjects in the 
economy to adjust to the equilibrium after full anticipated negative monetary shock depending 
on whether they face nominal or real environment. Results of Fehr and Tyran show that 
subjects, which have to face money illusion in form of nominal pay-offs adjust in much 
slower way in line with strategic complementarity. In other words, subjects (despite their 
rationality) have tendency to set prices close to the pre-shock price, consistently with 
development of the average price of n-1 players if only few players in reality suffer from 
money illusion. This proved that money illusion is persistent phenomenon, causing substantial 
nominal rigidities. Consequently, implications are derived for the economy at the aggregate 
level, strengthening thereby New Keynesian predictions. In line with previous methodological 
discussion, question arises, whether it is possible to derive implications from such laboratory 
experiment at the aggregate level. Based on afore-mentioned methodological discussion, the 
following comments are worth mentioning with regards to laboratory experiment used for our 
illustrative purposes. 
Firstly, one dimension concerns the well discussed number of subjects under scrutiny 
due to the belief that it is difficult to approximate macroeconomic world through a laboratory 
experiment with a small number of subjects. However, this macroeconomic experiment rests 
on micro-foundations in line with assumptions of New Keynesian economics built in 
experimental design. Figure 2 demonstrates more closely derivation of the aggregate level 
effects from individual behavior. 
 Figure 2: From individual effects to the aggregate effects 
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Microeconomic foundations of experiment are initially based on artificial economy 
with strategic complementarity, where pricing behavior of individuals is tested after the 
shock. Figure 2 shows that decision-making of individuals is tested in two different 
environments, based either on nominal or real pay-offs. Subjects j are expected to form wrong 
expectations about behavior of the other players i in an environment of nominal pay-offs. This 
is given by individual money illusion. Additionally this movement in wrong direction is 
multiplied since nominally confused individuals are followed even by rational subjects in an 
environment described by strategic complementarity. According to Fehr and Tyran (2001), 
these multiplied effects of individual money illusion are called indirect effects of money 
illusion. On the other hand, the control group in real environment is expected to form correct 
expectations about actions of j. Experimental results in this study proved the presence of 
strong indirect effects of money illusion, which are associated with nominal rigidities. This 
proof strengthens even more microeconomic foundations of New Keynesian theory and is 
additional reason for slow adjustment at the aggregate level, (others are imperfect 
information, implicit contracts, etc.). This is shown further in diagram, where actions of 
individuals are followed by aggregate outcomes. As a result the sample size need not be the 
relevant issue, as already suggested above and conclusion about nominal rigidities might be 
generalized at the aggregate level. Moreover, as emphasized by Duffy (2008), evidence from 
many auction experiments since Smith (1962) suggests that equilibration to competitive 
equilibrium occurs reliably with just a few individuals on supply or demand side market, so a 
large number of subjects need not be a necessary condition. 
Secondly, this experiment enables the collection of a type of data less directly 
observed in the field and even of better quality in terms of causation as suggested by Duffy 
(2008).  For instance, the examination of expectation formation after the shock is valuable 
output, which cannot be obtained otherwise. Additionally, it is extremely difficult to collect 
individual information sets regarding the actual price in the pre-shock and the post-shock 
phase in the field, needed for comparison with ideal equilibrium prices to identify nominal 
inertia, (Tyran 1999). Also identification whether the monetary shock is anticipated or not is a 
serious constraint. The experimental method (as opposed to field data) possesses an immense 
advantage in its control over the environment and information conditions. This is closely 
associated with causal relations (and internal validity), which are directly under experimental 
control, where the frame can be easily set by specification of treatment conditions as 
emphasized by Fehr and Tyran (2001), (2005). In this case environment of nominal and real 
pay-offs was created in experimental design. Examined phenomenon is secured by 
specification of treatment condition with possible elimination of all other factors, which 
should be constant, (See Table 1 for more details). Experimental group faces environment of 
nominal pay-offs, which represent the need of subjects to cope with some barrier, i.e. the need 
to recount nominal pay-off into the real pay-off. On the contrary, control group has to work 
with an environment of real pay-offs when making decision about the price of production. 
This does not represent any cognitive barrier and subjects should be pretty comfortable in this 
environment. When keeping other factors constant, we are able to examine phenomenon of 
confusion by nominal values by comparing the difference between these two examined 
groups. Since otherwise equal conditions are secured for both groups with sufficient 
elimination of all other effects, we may consider causal relation to be strong enough. This 
method “allows a dramatic reduction in the number of auxiliary hypotheses involved in 
examining a primary hypothesis”, thereby reducing Duhem-Quine problem as emphasized by 
Davis and Holt (1993, p.16). 
Table 1: Treatment Conditions 
 Treatment  Other factors 
Experimental Group Nominal pay-off Constant 
Control Group Real pay-off Constant 
Source: Fehr, Tyran, (2001), Guala (2005). 




Additionally, objections might be raised regarding the external validity of 
experimental results. However, in the case of the more theoretical character of the experiment 
examined in this case, there are fewer objections against lower external validity, which is 




Experimental macroeconomics is becoming increasingly popular method used even by 
well-known economists for evaluation of various economic phenomena. Like every 
alternative method even this field is under scrutiny of opponents, who point out that validity 
of experimental outputs might not be satisfactory. This article tried to tackle the most burning 
methodological issues of experimental macroeconomics. Consequently, illustrative case study 
follows, which provides further justification for conduct of macroeconomic experiments. 
Study shows that although economists need to be careful in making generalizations based on 
the results of an experiment that involves a small number of subjects, still less objection 
should be made against using experiments in order to test predictions of macroeconomic 
models based on explicit micro foundations. These experiments might provide guidance for 
how subjects perceive examined phenomenon with consequent generalization. For instance, in 
the economy with multiple equilibria it might indicate what equilibrium subjects consider as 
more relevant. Additionally, experimental data should be understood as a complement to 
standard econometric analysis of field data if there is no possibility how to gather some 
specific data or if field data do not possess the character, which is desirable for examination of 
specific phenomenon. Indeed, experimental data offer possibility, how to secure sufficient 
internal validity in terms of micro-level causal relationships and exhibit better characteristic in 
this sense than standard field data. Last but not least, we have to bear in mind in vein of Duffy 
(2008) that all experimental work should be judged by its findings and not deficiencies, since 
all empirical methods have their strengths and weaknesses.  
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